Thao knew that the restraint he witnessed, and intentionally assisted, grossly deviated
from the standard of care and risked death.
Thao received a total of 1,014 hours of MPD training on the topics discussed above,
including procedural justice training, crisis intervention training, defensive tactics training, and
CPR training. (Blackwell, Fed. Tr. Trans. at 988-989, 996; Fed. Tr. Exhs. 59 [Thao Workforce
Training], 61 [2018 Annual Refresher Defensive Tactics PowerPoint], 75 [April 2012
Administrative Announcement to Show Positional Asphyxia Training Video], 76 [April 2012
Positional Asphyxia Training Video]; Chauvin Tr. Exh. 111 [CPR Training Guide].)
Thao was trained to place a subject in the side recovery position as soon as possible to
alleviate the risk of positional asphyxia. Thao admitted that he was also trained to place a
person suffering from excited delirium in the side recovery position to avoid positional
asphyxia. (Fed. Tr. Trans. at 3367.) Despite his training, Thao knew that Chauvin, Kueng, and
Lane had restrained Floyd in the prone position with all three atop of him for many minutes,
including for minutes after Floyd was no longer talking, moving, and appeared to have passed
out.
Thao was regularly trained on how to provide CPR. Because Thao received MPD’s
training, Thao knew the importance of performing CPR as quickly as possible, including while
waiting for EMS to arrive. (Fed. Tr. Trans. at 3149.) And Thao also acknowledged that an officer
cannot “ignore” when a subject says they cannot breathe and that “it is a red flag if someone in
your custody suddenly stops talking.” (Id. at 3202-3203, 3170.) Yet Thao knew that no one was
performing CPR on Floyd even after Floyd stopped talking and even after Floyd appeared
unconscious.
As with the other officers, Thao had been trained only to use appropriate force
proportional to a subject’s resistance and to evaluate the use of force and de-escalate as
necessary throughout a restraint. (Fed. Tr. Trans. at 3162, 3171-73; Fed. Tr. Exh. 61 [2018
Annual Refresher Defensive Tactics PowerPoint]; Chauvin Tr. Exh. 119 [MPD 2018 Use of Force
In-Service PPT].) Thao also acknowledged that an officer cannot continue to use force on
someone who is not resisting, even a person suspected to be suffering from excited delirium.
(Fed. Tr. Trans. at 3313, 3223.) Thao was also trained that it is unnecessary to use force on
someone who is unconscious or does not have a pulse. (Id. at 3177.) Yet Thao knew Chauvin,
Kueng, and Lane continued restraining Floyd after he stopped resisting, was no longer speaking,
and appeared unconscious.
Thao was trained on the risk of injury when officers administer force to a person’s head,
neck, and sternum. Thao knew that MPD policy prohibits using a conscious neck restraint
unless the subject is “actively resisting.” (Fed. Tr. Trans. at 3194-3195.) Yet Thao knew that
Chauvin had his knee on Floyd’s neck and that Chauvin’s knee remained on Floyd’s neck long
after Floyd was no longer resisting or speaking. (State’s Supp. Exh. 24 [BCA Video Interview
with Thao], at 01:05:29-:54, 01:08:17-:26 (Thao acknowledging he could see Chauvin’s left knee
on Floyd’s neck and back).) Indeed, Thao acknowledged that at some point during the restraint
Floyd was not resisting and “was just laying there.” (Id. at 01:32:18-01:32:38.
)
Thao knew that Chauvin was not using a trained neck restraint. (State’s Supp. Exh. 24
(BCA Video Interview with Thao], at 01:05:56-01:06:06; see also State’s Supp. Exh. 23
[Transcript of BCA Video Interview with Thao], at 27507.) And Thao admitted that he was
obligated to stop another police officer if he saw that officer using excessive force. (Fed. Tr.
Trans. at 3177-3178.) Yet Thao stood by and did not stop Chauvin during the entire 9 minute
and 24 second restrain[/i]
